

APPENDIX D

RELATED OPERATIONS

This appendix describes the five major operations found in internal defense and development, and in foreign internal defense besides tactical operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and advisory assistance. While the brigade commander is mainly concerned with tactical operations in strike campaigns, he also recognizes that these five operations exist and support many activities in a COIN program. In consolidation campaigns, these operations normally take precedence, and tactical operations assume a supporting role. While the emphasis on any operation may shift in response to the needs of the situation, all of these operations occur at the same time and continuously.

Section I. INTELLIGENCE

When operating in a counterinsurgency environment, the population is considered a major source of intelligence. Since the conflict revolves around the population, the populace usually has a wealth of information that can be exploited.

D-1. INFORMATION SOURCES

The internal defense intelligence system consists of all host country military and civilian intelligence systems plus all US intelligence resources that are committed in-country to assist in preventing or defeating an insurgency. These agencies are coordinated and integrated under a single directorship in the National Internal Defense Coordination Center.

a. The intelligence resources of committed COIN forces are an integral part of this intelligence system. National agencies are usually targeted toward more *strategic* demands that require long-term intelligence networks and systems. COIN force intelligence assets are usually targeted toward *tactical* battlefield intelligence requirements and use intelligence gained through national systems.

b. In FID, intelligence organization requirements fall into three areas: preparedness, advice and assistance, and support of US units.

(1) *Preparedness*. Intelligence requirements are produced and filled in anticipation of a coun-

terinsurgency. This intelligence production fulfills contingency requirements. Examples of these requirements are background biographies, area studies, and order of battle for insurgent forces in areas likely to become involved in an insurgency.

(2) *Advice and assistance*. Advice and assistance increases the abilities of the host country intelligence organization.

(3) *Support of US units*. This support fulfills operational requirements for committed US units.

c. Some of the primary objectives of US intelligence organizations in FID include:

(1) Determining the indicators of an impending insurgency.

(2) Obtaining or developing enemy intelligence that can be used to launch surgical strikes by US forces.

(3) Obtaining information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population.

(4) Reducing to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

(5) Identifying the main sources of discontent among the people.

(6) Identifying the true nature, aims, leadership, potential power, and most likely course of action of the insurgency.

(7) Identifying and penetrating the insurgent infrastructure.

D-2. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Intelligence production in COIN operations in FID operations is performed in accordance with the intelligence cycle. This cycle consists of directing the intelligence effort, collecting raw information, processing this information into finished intelligence, and disseminating the intelligence for use by the commander and his staff.

a. **Directing.** The intelligence officer directs the intelligence effort. He translates the commander's guidance and concept of the operation into specific, prioritized intelligence requirements. A continuously updated collection plan provides the intelligence officer with a logical, orderly system for directing the collection effort. Ideally, it ensures that all required information is collected in time to be of use and that all possible sources of information are exploited by appropriate collection agencies.

b. **Collecting.** The need to exploit all sources of information requires resourceful, flexible, and aggressive direction and coordination of the intelligence collection effort. Commanders and intelligence officers must be aware of the abilities and limitations of all intelligence resources for their best use. Many collection techniques are employed such as the use of SOPs and the use of expedients and improvisations as required by local conditions and resources. Another technique is the employment of specialized intelligence personnel and equipment that may be placed in support of the brigade.

c. **Processing.** Processing is the phase of the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Raw (combat) information from all sources is evaluated, correlated, and analyzed to produce an all-source product. The effort to produce intelligence for support of COIN operations in FID requires continual and close coordination with higher, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and cooperating civil and military intelligence agencies and elements.

d. **Disseminating and Using.** The timely dissemination of available intelligence and its immediate use are vital in COIN operations in FID. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication may be established when facilities and resources permit.

D-3. CIVILIAN POPULATION

Exploitation of civilian sources of information in COIN operations normally requires a sophisticated intelligence organization that is resident within the population. However, as the COIN campaign progresses, the civilian populace may volunteer more intelligence information within the brigade operational area.

a. **Type of Information.** Civilian sources or informants normally provide the following information:

- (1) Details of the local terrain.
- (2) Ideological motivation and sympathies of local residents.
- (3) Logistic support available, or potentially available, to insurgents operating in the area.
- (4) Potential insurgent targets or objectives.
- (5) Identification of covert or part-time members of the insurgent force.
- (6) Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism techniques and activities of the insurgent and underground support organizations.
- (7) Weaknesses of the insurgent force.
- (8) PSYOP by the insurgent force and the impact on the local population.

b. **Information Source File.** To expedite the evaluation of information provided by the civilian populace, brigade intelligence personnel may need to establish records that quickly identify local sources of information and their reliability. When established, this information source file should include such information as—

- (1) Name, photograph, and physical description of source.
- (2) Area in which source(s) can obtain information.
- (3) Factors contributing to source's motivation to cooperate with COIN forces.
- (4) Information collection abilities of source to include indication of training received.
- (5) Method by which source is contacted.

(6) Record of payments or other remunerations, if made to source.

(7) Record of productivity and reliability of source.

c. Overt Exploitation of Civilian Sources. In overt exploitation, a source is contacted openly by the intelligence officer or one of his recognizable agencies, and information is solicited directly. This method has the advantage of providing for the immediate collection of information, but often entails significant disadvantages.

(1) The information requirements of the brigade or battalion are made apparent to the source, thus entailing a security risk.

(2) The source may not cooperate fully due to lack of motivation or fear of reprisal.

d. Clandestine Exploitation of Civilian Sources. Clandestine intelligence techniques are required in COIN operations in FID. They complement overt collection efforts to determine location, strength, and ability of insurgent forces, underground cells, and civilian supporters. Normally at brigade or battalion level it is hard to establish an original clandestine collection or informant system during the time the brigade or battalion is the area of operations. Therefore, the S2 should support reliable informant or clandestine collection operations that are being conducted by other US, allied, or host country agencies within the brigade or battalion area of interest. Intelligence collected through clandestine exploitation of civilian sources of information is made available to COIN commanders. This is done through an area control center, joint operations-intelligence center, or a similar facility established to coordinate internal defense and development operations.

D-4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence increases the security of all forces and the probability of attaining surprise in operations against insurgent forces. Adequate security measures are developed and continuously enforced. This helps to prevent penetration of the intelligence operation by hostile elements and to detect hostile elements already within the operation. Since insurgent forces are usually numerically inferior to those of the host country, allied, and US forces opposing them, the insurgent depends heavily on intelligence for successful operations. US brigades, in coordination with host

country authorities, must habitually emphasize counterintelligence measures.

a. Denial Measures. Denial measures that apply to COIN operations may include—

(1) Removal of compromised informant sources from the area of operations.

(2) Restrictions on movement and communication facilities of the civilian population within the area of operations.

(3) Thorough briefing of all US, allied, and attached host country personnel. This should include the intelligence practices and techniques used by the insurgent and his underground support organization, and information on security.

(4) Emphasis on the secure disposal of trash and waste matter.

(5) Employment of silent weapons by patrols.

(6) Normal activity while preparing for operations in order to avoid informing the insurgent force of a change in routine.

(7) Maintenance of strict security concerning current or projected logistic movements and the nature of supplies.

(8) Conduct of major troop movements during darkness or inclement weather and by the most rapid means.

b. Detection Measures. Appropriate detection measures in COIN operations may include—

(1) Background investigations and screening of all civilians employed by, or operating with, US and host country forces, and those in civil positions. Emphasis must be on controlling guides or trackers who are familiar with the location, disposition, and objectives of the friendly forces.

(2) Surveillance of all known or suspected members of the insurgent force and its infrastructure.

(3) Extensive employment of trip flares and ambushes in areas of suspected insurgent reconnaissance activity.

(4) Employment of infantry work dogs in conjunction with other security measures.

(5) Maximum emphasis on visual and electronic observation. Augmentation of organic visual aids and electronic detection devices is often required.

(6) Monitoring of civil communication media.

(7) Employment of women civil police officers for search and interrogation of women and children.

(8) Counterintelligence screening of the entire population of settlements suspected of intelligence activities in support of insurgent force.

(9) Wide distribution of photographs of known insurgents or key underground personnel to assist in the apprehension.

(10) Rewards for information leading to the capture of informants or other agents supporting the insurgent force.

(11) Periodic photographs of all residents of villages within the insurgent area of influence.

They are compared to determine additions to or deletions from the population in the interim.

(12) Issuance of closely controlled identification cards to all residents of the area of operations. In COIN operations, counterintelligence activities normally are complicated by the presence of large numbers of civilians of unknown reliance. It is hard to distinguish among the friendly, neutral, and hostile elements. All possible security measures that aid identifying these elements are employed continually.

c. **Deception Measures.** In COIN operations, units habitually plan and execute small-scale cover and deception.

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP in foreign internal defense include propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the achievement of national objectives. (For further information on psychological operations, see FM 33-1.)

D-5. BRIGADE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The purpose of brigade PSYOP is to enhance the accomplishment of the brigade's various FID missions. This is achieved by employing psychological principles to lessen or exploit the effects of tactical or nontactical operations upon the population or insurgent force.

D-6. PROGRAM CONCEPT

The overall PSYOP program for a given host country is established at the national level by a US-host country agency. This program provides guidelines for succeeding lower military and civilian echelons to use in the quest for popular support.

a. COIN units must ensure that their PSYOP is consistent with and supports US national objectives and the host country national PSYOP program. The brigade employs PSYOP to support its tactical strike and consolidation missions and to support intelligence operations, CA operations, and advisory assistance operations.

b. The allegiance of the people must be directed toward the host country rather than US brigade forces, ensuring announced programs and

projects are within reach. Coordination is accomplished in the local area control center.

D-7. ORGANIZATION

The PSYOP staff officers and units perform assigned missions the same as other specialized units or staff members that are attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade or battalion. When such support is not available, a member or section of the unit staff is assigned responsibility for incorporating PSYOP considerations into plans, action, and operations. PSYOP resources are provided either from higher headquarters units or from TOE resources. The units provide, in addition to advice, support in the form of loudspeaker teams, leaflets, and various other audiovisual media.

D-8. EMPLOYMENT

Properly integrated and employed in the planning and conduct of operations and activities, PSYOP can aid in accomplishing the brigade's mission. COIN forces must consider employing PSYOP in all missions. Commanders and staff officers must realize that all military operations have

psychological implications. PSYOP officers must be included in planning all activities.

a. Establishing support bases and operational support bases requires gaining the support of the populace nearby. Propaganda themes stress the purpose of US support and the military civic action program, the need for laborers, the effects of pilferage on the COIN effort, and that people do not discuss US and host country military activities.

b. Within an insurgency context, PSYOP has five major objectives:

(1) To assist the government in gaining the support of its population.

(2) To assist the government in defeating the insurgent movement.

(3) To assist the government in providing psychological rehabilitation for returnees from the subversive insurgent movement.

(4) To establish and maintain a favorable image in the host country.

(5) To influence neutral groups and the world community.

c. The major tasks of US PSYOP in an insurgency (when US combat forces are not yet committed) include—

(1) Advising host country PSYOP personnel on how to best exploit government programs.

(2) Recommending techniques for maintaining morale of host country forces.

(3) Assisting host country and US information agencies and activities in coordinating their efforts.

(4) Assisting host country personnel regarding PSYOP programs that will motivate the people to actively support their government.

(5) Recommending programs that will adversely affect the insurgent.

d. The major tasks of US PSYOP personnel in an insurgency (when US combat forces have been committed) include—

(1) Coordinating PSYOP activities with host country units.

(2) Advising US and host country commanders regarding insurgent activities and effects.

(3) Advising US commanders regarding the psychological effects of military actions.

(4) Assisting in development of a PSYOP ability within host country military forces.

e. Five major target groups for PSYOP are the insurgent, the population supporting the insurgent, the uncommitted population, government personnel, and foreign audiences. Themes are tailored to each of these groups to gain maximum support for the government.

f. When targeting the insurgent, the major PSYOP objective is to discredit the insurgent and to isolate him from the population. The most important direction of attack is against insurgent unit morale.

(1) Themes should publicize and exploit differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardships.

(2) Amnesty programs often prove useful in neutralizing insurgencies. They are most effective when they are sincere, credible, well publicized, directed against lower-ranking members of the insurgency, and offer good reasons and benefits for quitting the insurgent threat.

(3) Amnesty programs have several disadvantages. They recognize the insurgents as quasi-legitimate; they forgo punishment of anyone accepting amnesty; and they increase the image of the insurgent threat.

g. When targeting the population supporting the insurgent, the PSYOP objective is to achieve withdrawal of support for the insurgent and defection in place or person to the legitimate government. Themes should highlight insurgent shortcomings, ultimate governmental victory, government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of accepting amnesty.

h. When targeting the uncommitted population, the major PSYOP mission is to build national morale, unity, and confidence in the government. There should also be a major effort to win popular acceptance of the government force. It should include convincing the people that government programs serve their interests, government forces can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured, and the people have major intelligence and counterintelligence roles to play.

i. When targeting government personnel, the PSYOP should seek to maintain loyalties and to develop policies and attitudes. These result in group members who realize the importance of

popular support, promote public welfare and justice, try to eliminate causes of the subversive insurgency, and protect the population from the subversive insurgent.

(1) PSYOP should indoctrinate host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the civilian population and IDAD operations. Each soldier must understand that his actions toward the people may be the difference between success and failure.

(2) When government personnel interact with neutral and nonhostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive and constructive. PSYOP efforts should publicize the tangible and visible accomplishments of the legitimate government.

(3) PSYOP should discourage public apathy and activity that helps the insurgent. The people should not be asked to undertake any activity that is contrary to their own best interests.

j. When targeting foreign audiences, there are two major groups to be addressed: neutral nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of PSYOP is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support for the legitimate government. For hostile powers, the major PSYOP objective is to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency.

k. US PSYOP try to establish and maintain a favorable US image. The themes most useful in establishing an image are that the US presence is requested by host country government, it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory.

l. In combat actions, provisions are made for the safety of the civilian population and, if possible, for their separation from the insurgent forces so that maximum firepower can be employed against the insurgent. The decision to employ PSYOP media to accomplish this task is carefully weighed against compromising surprise and security.

m. Intelligence operations are aided by employing PSYOP media in telling people to report information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and insurgent activities. Posters and leaflets provide clear instructions as to persons and places that receive this information. The message indicates if rewards are available.

n. Captured or defected leaders of the insurgent force are exploited. Written and broadcast messages prepared by these personnel and reviewed by trained PSYOP personnel are used in communities suspected of supporting insurgent forces, and in tactical operations against insurgent forces.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS

The CA role in FID takes the form of civic assistance and civic action.

D-9. GOVERNMENT-BUILDING

Civic assistance is defined as providing advice and assistance to indigenous civil and military authorities in the sociological, economical, and political aspects of a civil emergency, disorder, or IDAD. It is commonly referred to as government-building since it is directed toward the structures of government. Military civic action is defined as the participation of indigenous military forces in short-term projects. These projects are useful to the local population, and contribute to social and economical development.

a. Civic action programs are divided into long-range and short-range programs. Long-term deals with resolving social and economical prob-

lems. Short-range is designed to gain and retain the loyalty of the population.

b. CA operations are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. They include any activity of military forces concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. Activities may range from military civic action projects to the use of authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

D-10. OPERATIONAL SCOPE

The scope of CA operations varies with the type of local government. It is influenced by the social,

economical, and political backgrounds of the country and people.

a. Some major CA activities include—

- Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.
- Support of government functions.
- Community relations.
- Military civic action.
- Assistance for populace and resources control.
- Civil defense.

b. The overall objective of CA in FID is to mobilize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. The operations are directed at eliminating or reducing military, political, economical, and sociological problems. Close and continuous PSYOP support is needed to maximize the effect of CA.

c. All military units have the ability to conduct CA, particularly military civic action. Major roles in military civic action are often assumed by engineer, transportation, medical, and other units that have assets suited to support military civic action projects.

d. Both civic assistance and civic action are geared to the phase of insurgency they are involved in. Several factors should be considered before a military unit begins a civic action project:

- (1) Is the project needed and wanted?
- (2) Will military participation compromise civilian authority and responsibility?
- (3) Does the project support the unit's political-military mission?
- (4) Does the project comply with the host country FID plan?
- (5) Will the project duplicate other efforts?
- (6) Will the people be involved in the project?
- (7) Will there be continuity of effort?

D-11. THE UNITED STATES ROLE

The normal role of the US military in civic assistance and civic action is to advise and assist host nation military forces. US military units rarely enter into direct civic action programs.

a. Units as small as a battalion task force may be assigned CA elements to assist in enforcing CA

plans. A civil-military operations staff officer may also be assigned to such a task force.

b. CA liaison and coordination should be set up between military forces and government agencies. This can be accomplished through organizations designed for this purpose or through CA staff elements.

c. CA operations require good relationships with the population. To establish a good relationship, troop discipline, courtesy, and honesty in dealing with the people are emphasized. Where rapport has been established between host country forces and the population, properly administered CA operations contribute to the attainment of FID objectives.

D-12. FIVE PHASES OF PLANNING

CA responsibilities assigned to a tactical unit commander may require employing specialized CA personnel or units. Host country CA plans should include provisions for CA support for tactical unit commanders. (For further information on CA organization, see FM 41-10.)

a. CA planning includes political, economical, social, psychological, and military considerations to include—

(1) A national development plan that involves projects that support development programs that meet the needs and desires of the people. Civic action projects conducted for merely something to do may be counterproductive.

(2) Military civic action projects conducted by military forces.

(3) CA personnel and units required to support host country agencies at subnational levels.

(4) CA mobile training team requirements and resources.

(5) CA training program requirements for host country and allied forces.

(6) CA requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country.

b. Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgent activities. Whatever the level of military civic action, projects are planned and coordinated with internal development programs. During Phase I of an insurgency, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socioeconomic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, many military re-

sources may be devoted to military civic action projects that provide both long-range and short-range benefits.

c. During Phases II and III, military civic action is concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensifying the insurgency. These projects produce noticeable improvements in a relatively short time. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational

programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects.

d. Advice is sought on projects to ensure they are needed, wanted, and coincide with development plans for the area. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on military operations may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to civilians. Other tasks are procuring and distributing food and shelter for displaced persons.

Section IV. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

P&RC operations are classified as nontactical, police-type operations.

D-13. POPULATION PROTECTION

P&RC is government action to protect the populace and its materiel resources and to deny those resources that would further hostile objectives against the government. The objective of P&RC operations is to assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law and order within a nation or area. Four main tasks are involved in reaching this objective:

- a. Providing security for the populace.
- b. Detecting and neutralizing the insurgent apparatus.
- c. Severing any relationship between the insurgent and the populace.
- d. The measures employed must be the least restrictive in accomplishing the purpose. Their needs must be explained to the people, and the restrictions must be lifted as soon as the situation permits.

D-14. AVAILABLE FORCES

Three forces are available to conduct populace and resources control operations.

- The civil police are the first line of defense in the battle against an insurgency.
- Paramilitary forces may augment or assist the civil police.
- The nation's military forces should be employed only when civil police and paramilitary units cannot cope with the insurgent activity.

a. Control of the populace and resources should be performed by host country agencies. This is a matter of practicality, but there are also legal and psychological implications. US military should be used as a last resort and only as augmentation to host country units. MP units should be used before combat troops.

b. Populace and resources control measures can be classified into three categories:

(1) Surveillance of individuals, groups, activities, or locations by overt or covert means.

(2) Restrictions such as curfews; travel permits; registration of firearms; national registration and identification of all persons; and control of selected foodstuffs, medical supplies, and equipment.

(3) Enforcement through the use of roadblocks, checkpoints, rewards, amnesty programs, and selective inspections of homes at night.

c. These control measures should be well planned and coordinated to ensure rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay and inconvenience to the people. P&RC complements and supports other COIN operations and environmental improvements being conducted by the military forces. It also contributes to the overall stability of the country or the operational area.

D-15. CENTRAL THEME

The central theme of populace and resources control is population.

a. PSYOP should convey this theme and be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) To persuade the people to accept the needed measures before implementation.

(2) To convince the people that their full support will reduce the inconvenience of the measures.

(3) To place the blame for any inconveniences or discomfort on the insurgents.

b. Border operations are taken (as part of populace and resources control) to isolate the insurgent from his outside support. Outside support deals with many activities. It may range from pro-

vision of funds and training of individual insurgents by an outside power to providing an active sanctuary for combat forces.

c. The most frequent populace and resources control operations US units may engage in include—

- Border operations.
- Cordon and search.
- Augmentation of enforcement operations (roadblocks, checkpoints).

Section V. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

Advisory assistance is advice and assistance US personnel provide to host country regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces. It is also provided to civilian agencies to help them become effective in the performance of their missions.

D-16. TACTICAL BACKUP

The activities named above support and, in turn, are supported by tactical operations, intelligence operations, PSYOP, P&RC operations, and military civic action. Such assistance is designed—

a. To provide military assistance in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force to the host country.

b. To participate in joint internal defense training and exercises as mutually agreed upon by the services concerned.

c. To provide mobile training teams, CSS, and CS to advise, train, assist, and support host country forces.

D-17. ARMY ASSISTANCE

The main purpose of US Army assistance is to increase the abilities of host country armed forces.

a. The brigade may be required to organize, train, equip, and advise host country civil and military personnel and units to perform COIN missions. Tasks include—

(1) Organizing, equipping, training, and advising paramilitary and irregular forces (locally recruited) to assume local defense missions from the brigade.

(2) Equipping, training, and advising host country regular armed forces on new equipment provided by MAPs and FMS.

(3) Organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country police organizations.

(4) Advising host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, and local governments in all aspects of internal defense and development.

b. Brigade advisory assistance to host country personnel and organizations, as differentiated from military civic action, usually is performed to extend security assistance activities. Such activities as organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country forces may be accomplished while in base areas. They may also be accomplished during the defensive phase of consolidation operations of COIN tactical operations.

c. If US military assistance organizations are operational, advisors usually are provided for this purpose. However, when US advisors or mobile training teams are not available, brigades may be required to assume this function. Advisory assistance is coordinated closely with both the internal defense and the internal development programs through the local area control center.

D-18. BRIGADE ORGANIZATION

All brigade organizations should be prepared to provide individuals or teams who can perform advisory assistance. (For further information, see FMs 100-5 and 100-20.)

a. Organization for advisory assistance operations may require the tailoring of specific teams to accomplish specific missions.

(1) MP units, augmented by brigade elements, may be required to train host country MP organizations in the area. Also, combined arms teams may be required to train local host country artillery and armor units in artillery and armor tactics and techniques.

(2) Training centers may be required to warrant them if the training load is sufficient.

(3) Teams from brigade units may be organized for on-duty training of host country specialists. These specialists are trained in the use of specialized equipment. This equipment is organic to brigades but will be supplied to host country forces at a later date.

(4) Mobile training teams formed by the brigade may be dispatched to local host country forces to conduct training at host country unit bases or training centers.

b. Advisory assistance operations inherently involve the need to use advisory techniques. Therefore, tact, discretion, language qualification, expertness in the subject, and other qualifications must be stressed.

c. A major consideration in organizing for advisory assistance is the military rank of the advisors. In many countries, it is not appropriate to have someone of less rank advising a unit or an element. To avoid this, commanders may need to frock or designate acting sergeants in order to give the impression that personnel of equal or greater rank performing advisory assistance.